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ABSTRACT
Recent advances in geolocated capacities, secure and veri-
fied positioning techniques, ubiquitous connectivity, as well
as mobile and embedded systems, have led to the develop-
ment of a plethora of Location-Based Services (LBS), per-
sonalizing the services they deliver according to the location
of the user querying the service. However, the widespread
use of mobile equipments, with ever increasing availability,
precision, performance and connectivity have introduced the
creepy feeling of being continuously monitored, in particular
by the providers of the LBS. Thus, beyond the benefits they
provide, users have started to be worried about the privacy
breaches caused by such systems. The main objective of
this paper is to discuss the privacy issues raised by LBS and
the challenges of implementing privacy-preserving location-
aware systems. Moreover, we also give a brief overview of
positioning techniques used by LBS and we introduce the
novel concept of locanym, which corresponds to a pseudonym
linked to a particular location that could be used as a basis
for developing privacy-preserving LBS.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Due to the rapid advances in positioning technologies such
as Global Positioning System (GPS), Global System for Mo-
bile Communication (GSM), Radio Frequency IDentification
(RFID), and WiFi (802.11b/g/n) and the widespread de-
ployment of wireless local area networks, mobiles devices
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are often equipped with geolocated and wireless communi-
cation capacities. These recent development of ubiquitous
devices have lead to the development of a new class of ser-
vices known as Location-Based Services (LBS), that are tai-
lored to the current location of the individual querying the
service. LBS can access, combine, and transform contextual
information, and more specifically location information, in
order to personalize the service provided to the user. For in-
stance, a LBS can be used for resource discovery (e.g., find-
ing the closest restroom from my position1), path-finding
(e.g., computing the shortest route to a gas station), real-
time social applications (e.g., informing me about the pres-
ence of my friends in the vicinity2) or location-based gaming
(e.g., playing with the nearest challenger).
When people use LBS to support them in their daily
tasks, their position is usually acquire automatically through
mobile equipments they carry with them. Thus, these sys-
tems continuously monitor and reveal information about the
location of their users as the position of these mobile sys-
tems is essentially the same as the users of such system (e.g.,
which could be a single individual or a small group of persons
such as a family). In most of the cases, the collected location
data is transmitted to another system (typically a central-
ized server or another mobile equipment), which needs this
information to provide the LBS (e.g., to generate the list
of nearby restaurants3) or to participate to its computation
(e.g., to help two people to meet at the optimal rendezvous
point4). However, the collection and transmission of such
data can also be used against the privacy of a user, either at
the time of transmission (e.g., to send unwanted advertise-
ment), or later in the future (e.g., to detect that the user has
violated the speed limit while driving his car [8]). Moreover,
inference attacks [9] can be used to extract personal infor-
mation from the observed mobility travels of an individual
such as the Points Of Interests (POIs) characterizing his mo-
bility (e.g., home, place of work or even the hospital that he
often visits), to build mobility models that can predict with
an high accuracy his past, current and future locations, as
well as to deduce a part of his social graph by inferring that
1www.have2p.com
2www.loopt.com
3www.have2eat.com
4www.rendevousSpot.com
he has a social relationship with the individuals with whom
he shares often the same physical location.
In order to address and mitigate these privacy issues, re-
cently there has been a huge interest in the design of privacy-
preserving versions of LBSs providing high quality of service
while preserving the privacy of their users. In this paper, we
elaborate on how privacy can be integrated in location-aware
systems through a few examples highlighting the complexity
of addressing such issues. We also argue that privacy needs
to be taken into account in LBS by grounding in fundamen-
tal privacy principles capturing the privacy needs of users of
such systems. Additionally, we believe that addressing pri-
vacy in LBS should embed privacy protection and control
mechanisms as fundamental requirements on all the levels
of the system. The outline of this paper is the following.
First in Section 2, we review the concepts of location-based
services and secure positioning. Afterwards, in Section 3, we
conduct a privacy analysis of some existing LBS. Finally, in
Section 4 we define some desirable properties that any LBS
should fulfill to protect the privacy of their users. We also
introduce the notion of locanyms, which captures most of
these privacy requirements, before concluding through an
illustration on how these properties apply to a specific LBS.
2. LOCATION-BASED SERVICES AND SE-
CURE POSITIONING
A LBS can be defined as a service that takes as input the cur-
rent location of a user (generally acquired through a mobile
device carried by this user) and tailors its output depending
on the acquired location data. For instance, a user visiting
a shopping mall may call a LBS to locate the closest shop
that matches his budget and its clothing preferences. There-
fore, location data are usually augmented with complemen-
tary information related to the user, thus further increas-
ing the privacy risks. The ability to provide the user with
a customized service depending on his location could also
be used by companies to send targeted advertising and for
billing purposes, by banks to perform authentication based
on the location, and by restaurant owners to propose dis-
count to users passing nearby. The above list is far from
being exhaustive, as one could think about position-based
access control in which the access to a particular resource is
granted only to persons that are physically located inside a
predefined perimeter. For instance, a printer or fax machine
could be accessible only to persons located within a set of
offices, or a pizza delivery service might first verify if the
person placing the order is indeed located at the specified
delivery address.
One of the first question that naturally arises when deal-
ing with LBS is how a particular user can convince others
about the validity of its current position. More precisely, the
user can be viewed as a prover, who claims to be currently
at a particular location, and which wants to convince a set
of remote verifiers that he is indeed at the claimed position.
Thereafter, we will refer to this problem as Secure Position-
ing or sometimes as Secure Position Verification. Secure
Positioning is a fundamental problem that has to be tack-
led when designing a secure LBS and that can be addressed
by designing a technique enabling the prover (i.e., the user)
to prove its position through interactions with a group of
verifiers. In the following, we review the two main families
of approaches that have been proposed to tackle this prob-
lem (i.e., distance-bounding protocols and received signal
strength), and we briefly discuss their pros and cons.
2.1 Distance-bounding Protocol
The approach based on Distance-Bounding Protocol (DBP)
[3] (sometimes also called Time-of-Flight (TOF), Round-
Trip Time (RTT) or Round Time-of-Flight (RToF)) aims
at measuring the relative proximity of two devices using
physical limits on information propagation speeds. A DBP
protocol involves generally two participants, a prover and a
verifier, and enables the verifier to place an upper bound on
the physical distance separating him from the prover with-
out requiring the assistance of a third party. The general
schema of a DBP is the following: first, the verifier sends
a challenge to the prover and starts his own timer. Upon
reception of the challenge, the prover performs some com-
putation (in some scheme, the computation simply consists
in sending back the message [17]) in order to construct the
response to the received challenge and then sends it to the
verifier, which stops his timer upon reception of the answer.
By multiplying the elapsed time with the propagation speed
of the signal (e.g., ultrasound or electromagnetic signals),
the verifier can deduce an upper bound on his distance to
the prover. Moreover, in addition to the DBP, it is possible
to add a layer of authentication by having the prover au-
thenticate himself to the verifier by using some secret shared
between the prover and the verifier, thus proving that the
entity responding to the challenge is indeed the prover that
has initiated the DBP.
The security of DBP is based on the assumption that
it should be impossible for the prover to send the response
before receiving the challenge [3]. In addition, it is assumed
that the processing time needed to compute the response
upon reception of the challenge should be negligible com-
pared to the propagation time of the message in order to
estimate an accurate upper bound on the location of the
prover. This requirement can be easily met for DBP based
on ultrasounds in which the processing time of the prover
needs to be in the order of microseconds to attain reasonable
precision [16]. However, in this context some security prob-
lems arise since (ultra-)sounds are not resistant to active
attackers that can physically alter the signals. For instance,
such an attacker can modify the medium (e.g., sound travels
faster through metal than through the air) or use Radio Fre-
quency (RF) wormholes (e.g., by retransmitting the signal
using electromagnetic waves) to claim that it is closer from
the verifier than he really is. Current knowledge of physics
ensures that nothing can travel faster than light, and hence
RF-based DBP (whose travel speed is very close to that of
light) seems more robust, at least in the sense that they for-
bid such wormhole attacks. In this situation, the only threat
left is that the attacker can claim to be further away than he
really is by delaying his response. This does not contradict
the main objective of the DBP that is to derive an upper
(and not a lower) bound on the distance from the prover to
the verifier. However, with RF-based DBP, the prover’s pro-
cessing time needs to be in the order of nanoseconds, which
in the worst case allows a malicious prover to pretend be
closer to the verifier by approximatively 15 centimeters (as-
suming that the malicious prover is able to process signals
instantaneously).
Brands and Chaum [3] were the first to introduce the
concept of DBP that can be used to verify the proximity of
a device in a cryptographic manner. This seminal work has
lead to the design of a following DBP from Hancke and Kuhn
more appropriate for RFID tags and dealing with noisy en-
vironments [11], and a plethora of other protocols [2, 18,
20, 21]. Despite their accuracy and well-founded security
models, most DBP suffer from location privacy leakage [15].
More precisely, they always leak some information about the
location and distance of the different communicating part-
ners even to passive attackers that only eavesdroppes the
communications.
2.2 Received Signal Strength Indicator
An approach used by several Wifi-based localization sys-
tem is to measure the Received Signal Strength Indicator
(RSSI) of the radio signals used. The RSSI approach is
based on two observations: RF signal strength decreases 1)
when the transmitter and the receiver are further apart and
2) when there are obstacles between the transmitter and the
receiver. Based on these two observations, different read-
ings of the signal strength are measured on different points
of the location site and then recorded in a database. When
the system receives a location query from a user, the system
compares the user’s current signal strength values with the
values stored in the database. Based on this comparison,
the system is able to deduce the most probable location of
the user and returns it. In [14], the authors have proposed
a RF-based indoor location tracking system that processes
the signal strength information at multiple base stations.
Another localization system, WHAM! (Where AM I!) [12],
continuously records signal strengths received by a user’s
device, and disambiguates the current location of the user
by backtracking to the user’s previous locations in the floor
model, eliminating candidate locations that are not likely
to be reachable from its previous known locations. In [10],
the authors describe a practical robust Bayesian method for
topological localization that reduces the time required to
train the localizer while keeping the localization accuracy
good enough so that it can be used by an LBS. Many other
RSSI schemes exist in the literature and we refer the reader
to the following survey for more details [13].
Most RSSI schemes implicitly assume that the prover
uses a standard and unmodified wireless card. However, it
is not very difficult for an attacker to build a directional
antenna that can largely increase the sending or receiv-
ing range, and therefore in this case measuring the signal
strength does not lead to a good level of security. In ad-
dition, by jamming and replaying localization signals, an
attacker can convince a device to be in a location different
from its actual physical position [19]. As a countermeasure,
it was proposed to design a system based on collaborative
localization in order to enhance the accuracy of the position
estimation by leveraging and combining on the information
gathered by neighboring nodes [4]. However, anonymization
is a challenging task for the design of Wifi-based localization
systems. Indeed, users are primarily authenticated through
their MAC address in order to avoid undesirable deliveries of
messages to unappropriate nodes. Instead of using the true
MAC address, some systems [7] frequently and randomly
change the MAC address of the node (which can be seen as
pseudonym) to reduce the linkability risks.
3. PRIVACY ANALYSIS OF EXISTING
LOCATION-BASED SERVICES
Currently, there is no universal metric to quantify location
privacy that reached a consensus in the privacy commu-
nity. Hence, it is sometimes difficult to compare different
approaches aiming at building privacy-preserving LBS. Gen-
erally, each approach adopts its own definition of location
privacy and defines its own adversary model. Figure 1 pro-
vides an overview of several protocols and compares them
according to different criteria. In this section, we briefly
review their main features and how they address privacy.
Thereafter, we assume that the main objective of the at-
tacker is to track the location of a mobile node and this
attacker is equipped with eavesdropping capacities.
A Duress Alarm Location System (DALS) [5] was pro-
posed in the early nineties for the sole purpose of deter-
mining users location, and therefore does not provide any
data networking services or privacy protection. DALS uses
RF-signal strengths to determine the location of a user sim-
ilarly to RSSI localization techniques. Furthermore, DALS
makes use of specialized and costly hardware, and therefore
the trade-off between the deployment cost and the perceived
value of this system is not compelling enough for large-scale
adoption. RADAR [14] was designed to overcome the limi-
tations of DALS and can be deployed off-the-shelf over any
wireless LAN technology. More precisely, RADAR used a
RSSI localization technique and relies on a Viterbi-like al-
gorithm for continuous tracking of users’ location and dis-
ambiguation of candidate user locations with a precision of
a few meters (2 − 3 meters). With respect to privacy, con-
tinuous user tracking is a major threat as users may feel
that “Big Brothers is continuously watching them”. Further-
more, the communications exchanged can be eavesdropped
as their content is not encrypted by default for these proto-
cols. Another system, called WHAM! [12], works similarly
to RADAR, with the exception of the backtracking tech-
nique used, which improves the accuracy of the localization
results but causes the same security and privacy problems as
previous protocols. SkyHook [19] differs from the previously
described systems in the sense that the messages exchanged
are encrypted. Therefore, location information can normally
only be accessed by authorized entities. However, even if the
user knows which entity should in principle be responsible
for keeping his data private, he has no guarantee other than
the promises of this entity that his location data will not
be disclosed to other entities (e.g., for instance to a market-
ing company for a profiling purpose or to nearby shops for
targeted advertising).
Recently, a distributed cooperative scheme for Neighbor
Position Verification (NPV) [7] was proposed. It enables a
node playing the role of the verifier to discover and ascer-
tain the position of nearby nodes. The verifier can initiate
the protocol at any time, by triggering interactive proto-
col within his 1-hop neighborhood that consists in 4 rounds
of communication. The main objective of this protocol is
to let the verifier collect enough information so that he can
compute by himself the distances between any pair of neigh-
boring nodes. In this protocol, the messages exchanged are
made anonymous by taking advantage of the broadcast na-
ture of the wireless medium, thus enabling nodes to record
reciprocal timing information without disclosing their iden-
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Figure 1: Comparison of different localization protocols
tities. Afterwards, following a revelation message broad-
casted by the verifier, nodes disclose their identities only
to him through secure and authenticated messages, which
also contain the anonymous timing information they have
collected. Finally, the verifier uses this data to match the
different timings and identities and then performs a ToF-
based ranging to compute the distances between all pairs of
communicating nodes in its neighborhood. From the point
of view of privacy, this protocol ensures the anonymity of
communication by relying on a generator of MAC address
during the discovery phase in order to obfuscate the identity
of the prover. However, this protocol assumes that the ver-
ifier is trusted (i.e., honest). Indeed, the verifier is granted
the privilege to decide which entities are really in his proxim-
ity without requiring the help of an external trusted entity
to verify the correctness of this proximity map.
In general, a system that can be used to generate a certi-
fied proof of the location of a node is called a location proof
system. Zhu and Goa have proposed a privacy-preserving
location proof system called APPLAUS [22], which is com-
posed of the following elements:
1. A prover is a node collecting location proofs by broad-
casting when needed a location proof request to its
neighboring nodes through Bluetooth communications.
2. A witness is a node that accepts to generate a location
proof upon request and sends it back to the prover.
3. A location proof server is required for storing the his-
tory of location proofs. It communicates directly with
the provers when they submit their location proofs.
4. A certification authority (CA) is run by an indepen-
dent trusted third party. Upon joining the location
proof system, each mobile node registers with the CA
and pre-loads a set of public/private key pairs before
entering the network. The CA is the only entity that
knows the correspondence between the real identity of
a node and the pseudonyms (public keys) used by this
node.
5. A verifier is another node or an application that is au-
thorized to verify a prover’s location within a specific
period of time.
When a prover needs to generate a location proof at particu-
lar time, it broadcasts a location proof request to its neigh-
boring nodes through Bluetooth communications. Once a
neighboring node agrees to provide a location proof for the
prover, this node (now acting as a witness) generates a lo-
cation proof and sends it back to the prover. The prover
is responsible for forwarding this location proof to the loca-
tion proof server. Finally, an authorized verifier can send
a query that contains the real identity of the prover and a
time interval. The CA first authenticates the verifier, and
then converts the real identity contained in the query to its
corresponding pseudonyms during that time period and re-
trieves their location proofs for this particular time period
from the server. Changing pseudonyms on a regular basis
provides two benefits. First, it protects the location privacy
of each node by enhancing their unlinkability. Second, if the
location proof server is compromised or monitored, it will be
impossible for the attacker to identify the real source of the
location proof. More precisely, the privacy of APPLAUS is
ensured by the separation of trust: (1) the location proof
server knows only pseudonyms and their associated loca-
tions, (2) the CA knows only the mapping between the real
identity and its pseudonyms, and finally (3) the verifier only
sees the authorized locations visited by a node for which he
knows the real identity. The separation of trust ensures that
as long as the attacker does not control more than one of the
entity involved in the location proof system, it is impossible
for him to learn a user’s location because he does not have
access to enough knowledge.
4. TOWARDS PRIVACY-PRESERVING
LOCATION-BASED SERVICES
Location privacy can be broadly defined as the ability to
prevent an unauthorized entity from learning the past, cur-
rent or future locations of an individual. Based on this def-
inition, most of LBS mentioned previously do not ensure
location privacy. In order to reach this goal, we describe
thereafter the desirable properties that we believe that a
privacy-preserving LBS should fulfill:
1. Unlinkability and unforgeability. It should not
be possible to trace and link different locations visited
by a user. For instance, even if the user proves his
locations at different occasions, it should be impossible
to link the different location proofs being made by the
same user. Similarly, a user should not be able to fool
the system by forging a fake location proof.
2. Accountability and non-repudiation. The loca-
tion information collected by the mobile device of a
user should serve as a basis for deriving location proofs
that are verifiable in order to ensure the validity of the
user’s position over an elapsed time.
3. Sovereignty. The LBS should empower the user with
the control on how his location information is used
and disseminated in the system. More precisely, users
should be able to decide who can access their location
information and under which restrictions.
Additionally, we think that it is important to use a dis-
tributed architecture, rather than a centralized server, in
order to implement the LBS. Most of the systems described
previously make use of the past location of user to increase
the accuracy when predicting the current location or contin-
uously monitor their positions. Such information is usually
centralized by the LBS on a remote database server. How-
ever, if the security of this server is damaged, the privacy
breach that can occur can be very important. Moreover,
the computation of the positions by a central entity raises
the possibility of continuously tracking users, which could
also lead to a detailed profiling of the user. Therefore, to
address this privacy concern, we recommend to build LBS
by relying on a distributed architecture. In such an archi-
tecture, it is more difficult for an attacker to find the infor-
mation about the location of a particular user since he does
not have a single point of failure to attack to retrieve this
information, which is scattered around the network. More-
over, a distributed architecture also preserves the privacy of
users from being exposed to large companies, thus avoiding
the “Big brother is watching you” syndrome. Finally, we
also think that a privacy-preserving LBS should involve the
devices present within the current neighborhood of a user
to verify his position (collaborative behavior), in order to in-
crease the resilience of the system against an active attacker.
To encapsulate all these properties, we introduce the con-
cept of locanym, which summarize the fundamental privacy
requirements required to build a privacy-preserving LBS.
Definition 1 (Locanym) A locanym is a geolocated ver-
sion of a pseudonym tied to a particular geographical area.
More precisely, it aims at deriving, from an accurate and
verified positioning, a specific form of pseudonym provid-
ing the following properties: unlinkability, unforgeability, ac-
countability, non-repudiation and sovereignty.
In order to illustrate the importance of the privacy desider-
ata defined previously for the design of LBS, we will consider
a dynamic carpooling scenario based on locanyms. Dynamic
carpooling is an urban service in which drivers are dynami-
cally match with passengers from sub-urban to urban jour-
neys or intra-urban journeys. Privacy is of paramount im-
portance in such a setting as users move between places but
their mobility patterns should be kept private from other
entities (even from other mobile users that they periodically
meet and cooperate with) as they generally do not know
them and therefore cannot blindly trust them with their lo-
cation data. Consider for instance the scenario in which Bob
wishes to drive to a shop situated in the town’s outskirts.
Before starting his journey, Bob decides to switch on the
carpooling application to gain some experiences points (and
possibly some money). Approximately at the same period,
Alice wants to go to a shopping mall located somewhere on
Bob’s path.
Unlinkability and unforgeability. After starting her car-
pool engine by activating the passenger mode, Alice coop-
erates with the neighboring nodes (e.g, bus or other moving
nodes) to create her locanym data. By drawing on this lo-
canym, the carpooling application will be able to connect
Bob to Alice without disclosing her real identity since the
locanym is derived only from her location data. In partic-
ular, the request of Alice cannot be linked to her identity
before she meets physically with Bob (and vice-versa), which
ensures the anonymity of the users of the carpooling system.
Another issue is for Bob is to be sure of the truthfulness of
the location claimed by his potential carpoolmate. Indeed,
as the position of Alice is certified by her neighbors, she
cannot fool the system by forging a false location proof ex-
cept if a majority of her neighbors are colluding with her,
which should be sufficiently difficult to achieve in a realis-
tic mobile environment in order to ensure the security of
the application. Therefore, Bob can trust the carpooling re-
quest and decided whether or not to carpool with Alice. In
this situation, locanyms seem sufficient to ensure the mutual
authentication between Alice and Bob when they establish
their first relationship in a privacy-preserving manner.
Accountability and non-repudiation. Once the relation-
ship is established and the two participants physically meet,
the anonymity can be lifted and their identities revealed.
Moreover suppose that during the carpooling trip, some-
thing bad happens to Alice because of Bob. During a police
investigation if Bob denies having carpooled with her, Alice
can nonetheless prove that she was with Bob during a cer-
tain period. Indeed, the location proofs collected by Alice
mobile device can be used as an evidence. The account-
ability property can be important to prove to a third party
(such as the administration of the city) that another entity
(e.g., Bob) has actually participated in a carpooling activ-
ity. Moreover, the non-repudiation property, which can be
obtained through a combination of locanyms and digital sig-
natures, will also ensure that an entity cannot deny having
participated to a carpooling trip to which he has previously
given his explicit consent. The combination of accountabil-
ity and non-repudiation can also be used by the carpooling
service provider to offer some discounts to their regular users
(e.g., such as a discount on their transport subscription).
Sovereignty. Continuing on the carpooling scenario, sup-
pose that Alice does not want to carpool with Bob because
on some problems during previous trips. However, as lo-
canymity hides the identity of Bob, if such a concern is not
managed by the carpool system, Alice may have a bad sur-
prise when she arrives at the meeting place. Ideally it should
be possible for Alice to express in her carpooling request (for
instance in the form of a blacklist) that she does not want
to carpool with Bob. This property is a form a sovereignty
in the sense that Alice can decide with whom she wants (or
not) to share her location. Therefore, locanyms must take
into account privacy policies defined on location data by a
particular node. These privacy policies should be customiz-
able by the user depending of the privacy level needed in
the spirit of Platform for Privacy Preferences (P3P) [6].
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